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INTRODUCTION 
In 1942, the United States Supreme Court declared that 
obscene material is one of the few narrow and well-defined 
categories of speech outside the protection of the First 
Amendment of the United States Constitution.1  Since that 
time, the Court has struggled to create a clear articulation of 
what material is actually considered obscene.2  In an attempt 
to simplify the situation, the Supreme Court, in 1973, decided 
to defer to local communities and allow them to determine 
what is obscene, and therefore unprotected by the First 
Amendment.3  Juries would be asked to apply the 
contemporary community standards of the community where 
 
 1. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572–73 (1942). 
 2. Between 1942 and 2004, the Supreme Court has heard over seventy-five 
cases considering obscene material. 
 3. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973); see infra Part I.B. 
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they sat and determine if such material being considered was 
obscene.4  This meant that an adult magazine could be 
categorized as obscene in one community, but perfectly 
acceptable in another that is more tolerant of such content.5  
To be categorized as obscene, a jury must find that: (1) “the 
average person, applying contemporary community 
standards” would find the work as appealing to prurient 
interest, (2) the work is patently offensive, and (3) the work 
“lacks serious literary artistic, political, or scientific value.”6 
The Internet, however, has jeopardized the Court’s 
determination that local communities are the best judges of 
what is obscene.  Because the Internet can be accessed 
anywhere, a local community can no longer easily close its 
doors to certain adult material by passing ordinances against 
it.  It is relatively inexpensive to post material that is 
available nationwide, yet virtually impossible to post content 
that is only available to a single geographic area.7  As such, 
the least tolerant communities can access material posted on 
the Internet and apply their own “contemporary community” 
standards to Internet content available nationwide.  Given 
the difficulties in targeting Internet material to specific 
communities, these least tolerant communities inadvertently 
become the judge what is obscene on the Internet. 
This Comment addresses the problematic application of 
local community standards when judging obscene material 
posted on the Internet by analyzing a recent circuit split.  
Currently, the Ninth Circuit has abandoned the local 
community standard, finding that a national community 
standard is more in line with Supreme Court precedent.8  
Conversely, the Eleventh Circuit expressly rejected a national 
community standard and continues to apply a local 
community standard to Internet cases.9  To help illustrate the 
circuit split, this Comment will first discuss the courts’ 
struggle with developing the community standard.10  Second, 
it will analyze the merits and failures of the Ninth and 
 
 4. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24. 
 5. Id. at 32. 
 6. Id. at 24. 
 7. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 595 (2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 8. See United States v. Kilbride, 584 F.3d 1240 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 9. See United States v. Little, No. 08-15964, 2010 WL 357933 (11th Cir. 
2010). 
 10. See infra Part I. 
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Eleventh Circuits’ respective decisions.11  Finally, this 
Comment will review possible solutions and conclude that the 
only constitutionally permissible result is that obscenity 
cannot be regulated on the Internet.12 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. The Court’s Struggle to Develop an Obscenity Standard 
1. Obscenity as Unprotected Speech 
The First Amendment succinctly declares: “Congress 
shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”13  The 
Supreme Court has construed the meaning and held that “it 
is well understood that the right of free speech is not absolute 
at all times and under all circumstances.”14  In Chaplinsky v. 
New Hampshire, the Court stated, “[t]here are certain well-
defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the 
prevention and punishment of which have never been thought 
to raise any Constitutional problem.  These include the lewd 
and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or 
‘fighting words’ . . . .”15  The Court did not discuss why 
obscenity is within this narrowly limited class of speech.16  In 
subsequent cases, however—where the Court was asked 
specifically whether obscene material is unprotected by the 
First Amendment—it has relied on this statement and has 
continued to affirm that obscenity is in no way protected by 
the First Amendment.17  The problem, however, is that what 
constitutes obscene materials has not been “well-defined” or 
“narrowly limited.” 
 
 
 11. See infra Part II. 
 12. See infra Parts III and IV. 
 13. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 14. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942). 
 15. Id. at 572. 
 16. See id. 
 17. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 569 (2002) (“[O]bscene speech enjoys no 
First Amendment protection.”). 
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2. The Challenge of Defining Obscenity 
i. Development of a “Community Standard” 
The Court did not directly address obscenity as 
unprotected speech until 1957 when it decided Roth v. United 
States.18  There, the Court held, “[a]ll ideas having even the 
slightest redeeming social importance—unorthodox ideas, 
controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the prevailing 
climate of opinion—have the full protection of the [First 
Amendment] guaranties . . . .”19  Then, the Court held that 
“implicit in the history of the First Amendment is the 
rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social 
importance.”20  Thus, because obscene material is outside of 
the protection of the First Amendment, the Court, in effect, 
holds that it is “no essential part of any exposition of ideas.”21 
The result of the Roth decision was that federal and state 
governments could regulate or fully prohibit obscene 
material, so long as the obscenity statutes did not go too far 
and infringe on constitutionally protected speech.22  In Roth, 
the Court affirmed the conviction of a man charged with 
sending obscene circulars and advertisements in violation of a 
federal obscenity statute.23  The Court, however, gave no 
reason why the advertisements were obscene, nor a 
description of what the advertisements contained.24  Further, 
the Court provided little guidance to lower courts to 
determine what is obscene and therefore unprotected by the 
First Amendment, and what is not obscene and therefore 
given full First Amendment protection.  The Court did 
express satisfaction with the lower court’s test, which looked 
 
 18. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).  The Court noted that 
“[a]lthough this is the first time the question has been squarely presented to 
this Court, . . . expressions found in numerous opinions indicate that this Court 
has always assumed that obscenity is not protected by the freedoms of speech 
and press.”  Id. at 481. 
 19. Id. at 484. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 485 (citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 
(1942)). 
 22. Id. at 483. 
 23. Id. at 480. 
 24. The court’s only discussion of the actual materials in question was when 
it stated the defendant was charged with “mailing obscene circulars and 
advertising, and an obscene book, in violation of the federal obscenity statute.”  
Id. 
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to “whether to the average person, applying contemporary 
community standards, the dominant theme of the material 
taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest.”25  The Court 
failed, however, to explain what “contemporary community 
standards” meant, or explain how lower courts are to apply 
such a standard.26 
The only issue that was clarified by the case is that 
obscene material must be sexual in nature.27  To confuse the 
issue further, however, Justice Brennan, writing the opinion 
of the Court, wrote “sex and obscenity are not synonymous.  
Obscene material is material which deals with sex in a 
manner appealing to prurient interest.”28  Thus, governments 
cannot regulate all speech dealing with sex, but only such 
speech that is appealing to the prurient interest and, thus, 
obscene.29 
Justice Harlan, in his dissent, expressed his concern with 
the majority’s opinion, believing that it is improper to entrust 
important constitutional decisions to a jury.30  He wrote that 
the majority opinion “obscure[s] the peculiar responsibilities 
resting on state and federal courts in this field and 
encourage[s] them to rely on easy labeling and jury verdicts 
as a substitute for facing up to the tough individual problems 
of constitutional judgment involved in every obscenity case.”31 
ii. The Court’s Failure at Defining Obscenity 
The Roth decision began a sixteen-year period where the 
Court could not agree as to what material was obscene and 
what was not.32  The Court faced two challenges.  First, the 
definition it would create could not be vague or overbroad.33  
Any definition the Court delineates will be used by lower 
 
 25. Id. at 489. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 487. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 480, 487. 
 30. Id. at 496. 
 31. Id. at 498. 
 32. The Court decided Roth in 1957 and it did not agree on a formal 
obscenity standard until it decided Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), 
more than fifteen years later. 
 33. The Court held that it is required that the language “conveys 
sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by 
common understanding and practices . . . .”  Roth, 354 U.S. at 491 (citing United 
States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1947)). 
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courts.  If the definition is vague or overbroad, lower courts 
may incorrectly deem constitutionally protected speech as 
obscene.  Second, the definition could not be overly narrow so 
as to infringe on what the Court saw as state governments’ 
historic rights to regulate and prohibit obscene speech that is 
constitutionally unprotected speech.34  This period 
demonstrates that the Chaplinsky Court was incorrect when 
it considered obscenity a “well-defined” category of speech 
outside of the protection of the First Amendment.35 
In 1962, in Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day,36 the Court 
held that three magazines containing photographs of nude 
male models were not obscene, but the Justices did not agree 
on a reason why.37  Justice Harlan, who dissented in Roth, 
stated, “we need go no further in the present case than to 
hold that the magazines in question, taken as a whole, 
cannot, under any permissible constitutional standard, be 
deemed to be beyond the pale of contemporary notions of 
rudimentary decency.”38  Justice Harlan, joined only by 
Justice Stewart, explained that they arrived at this 
conclusion upon their own examination of the material.  They 
found that although the magazines were “dismally 
unpleasant, uncouth, and tawdry . . . ,” they were not 
obscene.39 
Justices Harlan and Stewart wrote that “[o]bscenity . . . 
requires proof of two distinct elements: (1) patent 
offensiveness; and (2) ‘prurient interest’ appeal.”40  The 
magazines, Harlan explained, were designed to appeal to the 
prurient interest, but were not necessarily patently 
offensive.41  Interestingly, the two Justices believed that to 
judge whether material is patently offensive, courts should 
apply a national community standard when judging whether 
materials are patently offensive pursuant to federal law.42  
 
 34. See id. at 488. 
 35. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942). 
 36. Manual Enters., Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478 (1962). 
 37. Id. at 495. 
 38. Id. at 489. 
 39. Id. at 490. 
 40. Id. at 486. 
 41. Id. at 486.  Justice Harlan notes that the “portrayals of the male nude 
cannot fairly be regarded as more objectionable than many portrayals of the 
female nude that society tolerates.”  Id. at 490. 
 42. Id. at 488. 
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When judging obscene material, Harlan wrote: 
There must first be decided the relevant “community” in 
terms of whose standards of decency the issue must be 
judged.  We think that the proper test under this federal 
statute, reaching as it does to all parts of the United 
States whose population reflects many different ethnic 
and cultural backgrounds, is a national standard of 
decency.43 
Because only Justice Stewart shared Justice Harlan’s 
opinion, however, the question of what “contemporary 
community standards” meant remained unanswered.44  
Further, no other Justices agreed with, or wrote of, applying 
a national community standard.45 
Two years after Manual Enterprises, the Court revisited 
the obscenity standard issue, but once again failed to garner 
the support of five Justices to determine exactly what 
community standard meant.46  In Jacobellis v. Ohio, Justice 
Brennan accepted Justice Harlan’s idea of a national 
community standard47 and unequivocally rejected that the 
community standard expressed in Roth should be a local 
standard.48  He wrote that the community standard refers “to 
‘the community’ in the sense of ‘society at large; . . . the 
public, or people in general’ ” 49 and that the “concept of 
obscenity would have ‘a varying meaning from time to time’—
not from county to county, or town to town.”50  He justified his 
argument by explaining that if a local community standard 
was appropriate, then purveyors of sexually explicit material 
might practice self-censorship,51 a practice that the Court has 
consistently held to unconstitutionally chill speech.52  Only 
 
 43. Id. 
 44. See id. 
 45. See id. 
 46. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964).  In Jacobellis, the Court held 
that the French film The Lovers, which contained a single explicit love scene, 
was not obscene.  Id. at 196. 
 47. Id. at 193. 
 48. Id. at 192 (“It has been suggested that the ‘contemporary community 
standards’ aspect of the Roth test implies a . . . the particular local community 
from which the case arises.  This is an incorrect reading of Roth.”). 
 49. Id. at 193. 
 50. Id.  
 51. Id. at 194. 
 52. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 154 (1959) (“The bookseller’s self-
censorship, compelled by the State, would be a censorship affecting the whole 
public, hardly less virulent for being privately administered.  Through it, the 
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two Justices, however, supported a national community 
standard.53  Further, Justice Harlan, who wrote two years 
earlier of a national community standard, dissented and 
wrote that that a national standard is only appropriate when 
applying federal but not state law.54 
Jacobellis stands at the pinnacle of uncertainty in 
judging obscene material.  In one of the most telling and 
candid statements, Justice Stewart wrote, 
I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of 
material I understand to be embraced within that 
shorthand description; and perhaps I could never succeed 
in intelligibly doing so.  But I know it when I see it, and 
the motion picture involved in this case is not that.55 
Justice Stewart’s comment is curious considering the serious 
ramifications that occur when material is found to be obscene.  
Without a clear definition of what constitutes protected non-
obscene speech and what falls outside of the protection of the 
First Amendment, purveyors of sexually explicit material risk 
going to jail if they cross that line.56  Here, for example, the 
petitioner probably would not have found Stewart’s statement 
humorous if the Court determined that the motion picture 
was “that” and affirmed his conviction.57 
In December, 1965, the Court again attempted to create 
an obscenity standard when it heard three separate obscenity 
cases.58  Justice Brennan wrote the majority opinion, or 
announced the decision of the court when there was no 
majority, in each of the three cases.59  In Ginzburg v. United 
States and Mishkin v. New York, the Court was able to avoid 
 
distribution of all books, both obscene and not obscene, would be impeded.”). 
 53. Jacobellis, 378 U.S. at 195 (“[T]he constitutional status of an allegedly 
obscene work must be determined on the basis of a national standard.  It is, 
after all, a national Constitution we are expounding.”). 
 54. See id. at 203 (Harlan, J., dissenting).  Harlan explained, “[s]tates are 
constitutionally permitted greater latitude in determining what is bannable on 
the score of obscenity than is so with the Federal Government.”  Id. 
 55. Id. at 197. 
 56. See id. at 201 (Warren, C.J., dissenting). 
 57. Petitioner was charged with violating Ohio Revised Code Section 
2905.34, which stated that “[w]hoever violates this section shall be fined not 
less than two hundred nor more than two thousand dollars or imprisoned not 
less than one year nor more than seven years, or both.”  Id. at 186 n.1; OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. § 2905.34 (LexisNexis 2012). 
 58. Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966); Memoirs v. Day, 383 
U.S. 413 (1966); Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966). 
 59. Ginzburg, 383 U.S. 463; Memoirs, 383 U.S. 413; Mishkin, 383 U.S. 502.  
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applying a community standard when evaluating the 
material in question.  First, in Ginzburg, the Court upheld 
the conviction of a man who violated a federal obscenity 
statute when he mailed three different sexually explicit 
publications via the United States Post Office.60  They 
contained a variety of articles relating to sex and sexuality, 
and photo-essays containing nude models.61  The Court 
avoided addressing an obscenity standard and instead upheld 
the conviction because the purveyors were selling the 
material to appeal to people’s interest in sexuality.62  The 
court held: “[the purveyors] deliberately emphasized the 
sexually provocative aspects of the work, in order to catch the 
salaciously disposed.”63  This holding seems to reject Harlan’s 
belief expressed in Manual Enterprises, that the material 
must be patently offensive.64  Here, the Court did not address 
whether the material was patently offensive, and only ruled 
that it was outside of the protection of the First Amendment 
because the seller was distributing it to appeal to the prurient 
interest.65  Next, in Mishkin v. New York,66 the Court upheld 
the conviction of a man who violated a New York obscenity 
statute when he had printed “[f]ifty books . . . portray[ing] 
sexuality in many guises.”67  The Court avoided any 
discussion of a proper obscenity test because it found that the 
New York law at issue was actually stricter than the test 
articulated in Roth.68 
Finally, in Memoirs v. Massachusetts,69 the Court 
attempted to create an obscenity standard, but could not 
garner a majority of Justices to agree on a single test.70  The 
 
 60. See Ginzburg, 383 U.S. at 467. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 472. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Manual Enters., Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 486 (1962). 
 65. Ginzburg, 383 U.S. at 473 (“[T]he prosecution succeeded . . . when it 
showed that the defendants had indiscriminately flooded the mails with 
advertisements, plainly designed merely to catch the prurient . . . .”). 
 66. Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966). 
 67. Id. at 505. 
 68. Id. at 508. 
 69. Memoirs v. Day, 383 U.S. 413 (1966). 
 70. See id.  In a 6-3 decision, four concurring opinions and three dissenting 
opinions were written.  Justice Brennan announced the decision of the court 
and was joined in his opinion by Chief Justice Warren, and Justice Fortas.  
Justices Black, Douglas and Stewart wrote separate opinions.  Justices Clark, 
Harlan, and White wrote separate dissenting opinions. 
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Court was asked to review a Massachusetts Supreme Court 
decision that held that the book Memoirs of a Woman of 
Pleasure was obscene.71  Justice Brennan, joined by Chief 
Justice Warren and Justice Fortas, believed that to be 
considered obscene “three elements must coalesce.”72  First, 
“the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole 
appeals to the prurient interest in sex.”73  Second, “the 
material is patently offensive because it affronts 
contemporary community standards relating to the 
description or representation of sexual matters.”74  And, third, 
“the material is utterly without redeeming social value.”75 
Following the Ginzburg, Mishkin, and Memoirs decisions, 
the Court was forced to summarily reverse or affirm obscenity 
convictions because it could not agree on a single obscenity 
standard.76  Between 1966 and 1972, thirty-one cases were 
decided in this manner, with various reasons supporting why 
certain material was considered obscene.77  Problematically, 
these decisions provided no notice to producers of sexually 
explicit material.78  Those who distributed sexually explicit 
material would either have to take the risk and produce 
something that may be obscene, which could send them to 
jail,79 or speech used could be limited to well below the 
obscenity standard, which necessarily chills First 
Amendment rights.80 
B. The Development of the Miller Obscenity Standard 
1. Miller v. California and the Origins of the 
Contemporary Community Standard 
On June 21, 1973, the Court handed down five decisions 
dealing with obscenity, each written by Chief Justice 
Burger.81  In each of the five opinions, the Chief Justice 
 
 71. Id. at 414. 
 72. Id. at 418. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id.  
 75. Id. 
 76. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 n.3 (1973). 
 77. See id. 
 78. See id. 
 79. See id. 
 80. See id. 
 81. Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115 (1973); Miller, 413 U.S. 15; Paris 
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reaffirmed the holding that the First Amendment does not 
protect obscene material.82  Then, in Miller v. California, the 
Court articulated the test to be used when determining 
whether something is or is not obscene.83  The Court held: 
The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) 
whether “the average person, applying contemporary 
community standards” would find that the work, taken as 
a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the 
work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, 
sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state 
law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks 
serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value.84 
(Citations omitted). 
Further, the Court held that obscene material is only that 
which “depict[s] or describe[s] patently offensive ‘hard core’ 
sexual conduct . . . .”85 
In explaining the test, the Court rejected the proposition 
that “contemporary community standards” should be a 
national standard, but rather held that the community in 
which the material was found should judge the material.86  
The Court justified applying a contemporary community 
standard by arguing that “[i]t is neither realistic nor 
constitutionally sound to read the First Amendment as 
requiring that the people of Maine or Mississippi accept 
public depiction of conduct found tolerable in Las Vegas, or 
New York City.”87  In effect, the Court wanted to maintain a 
level of autonomy for certain communities, and protect those 
communities from the thrusts of obscene material that might 
 
Adult Theatre v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973); United States v. 12 200-Foot Reels 
of Film, 413 U.S. 123 (1973); United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139 (1973).  Each 
of the five decisions were 5-4 votes, with Chief Justice Burger, joined in by 
Justices White, Blackmun, Powell and Rehnquist, on one side, and Justices 
Brennan, Douglass, Marshall and Stewart dissenting on the other side. 
 82. 12 200-Foot Reels of Film, 413 U.S. at 126; Kaplan, 413 U.S. at 119; 
Miller, 413 U.S. at 23; Paris, 413 U.S. at 54; Orito, 413 U.S. at 143. 
 83. The appellant in Miller was convicted for violating California Penal 
Code section 311.2(a) by sending through the mail unsolicited advertising 
brochures that contained obscene pictures and drawings.  Miller, 413 U.S. at 16; 
CAL. PENAL CODE § 311.2(a) (West 2006). 
 84. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24. 
 85. Id. at 27.  The Court later affirmed this in Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 
153 (1974), when the court held that the critically acclaimed movie Carnal 
Knowledge, which starred Jack Nicholson and Ann Margaret, was not obscene. 
 86. Miller, 413 U.S. at 32 n.13. 
 87. Id. at 32. 
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be acceptable in more tolerant communities.88 
In Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton,89 decided the same day 
as Miller, the Court held that states have the right to 
regulate the exhibition of obscene material in adult 
theaters.90  Using this as their weapon, the Court held that a 
city may prohibit an adult theater from exhibiting obscene 
movies, even when the movies were only shown to consenting 
adults who paid admission to the films.91  It did not matter 
that the viewers of the movie were willing recipients, unlike 
those in Miller, where the recipients viewing the obscene 
material were unsuspecting adults.92 
Interestingly, Justice Brennan, the author of the three 
obscenity decisions decided in 1965,93 dissented in each of the 
cases.94  He lamented that “[n]o other aspect of the First 
Amendment has, in recent years, demanded so substantial a 
commitment of our time, generated such disharmony of 
views, and remained so resistant to the formulation of stable 
and manageable standards.”95  As a result, Justice Brennan 
stated, 
[A]fter 16 years of experimentation and debate I am 
reluctantly forced to the conclusion that none of the 
available formulas, including the one announced today, 
can reduce the vagueness to a tolerable level while at the 
same time striking an acceptable balance between the 
protections of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, on 
the one hand, and on the other the asserted state interest 
in regulating the dissemination of certain sexually 
oriented materials.96 
He then concluded, that because no distinction can be 
articulated between obscene and non-obscene material, it is 
improper to suppress obscene material.97 
 
 88. See id. 
 89. Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973). 
 90. Id. at 69. 
 91. See id. at 57. 
 92. See id. 
 93. See supra text accompanying notes 48–68. 
 94. See Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115, 120 (1973); Miller v. California, 
413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973); Paris Adult Theatre, 413 U.S. at 53; United States v. 12 
200-Foot Reels of Super 8mm Film, 413 U.S. 123, 126 (1973); United States v. 
Orito, 413 U.S. 139, 143 (1973). 
 95. Paris Adult Theatre, 413 U.S. at 73. 
 96. Id. at 84 (Brennan, J. dissenting). 
 97. See id. at 83. 
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C. Refining the Miller Standard 
Despite the Miller test’s supposed clarity,98 the confusion 
regarding the scope of what constitutes the community 
standard continues.  In Miller, the Court found that the 
district court’s application of “contemporary standards of the 
State of California” was “constitutionally adequate.”99  Does 
this mean that contemporary community standards should be 
statewide or narrower? 
1. The Fluid Community 
A year after Miller, the Court again attempted to define a 
contemporary community standard.  In Hamling v. United 
States,100 the Court held that the jury is to be instructed to 
apply a community or vicinage standard and not a national 
community standard.101  The petitioner mailed obscene 
advertisements in violation of a federal obscenity statute and, 
following a jury trial, was convicted.102  Subsequent to the 
conviction, however, the Court decided Miller.103  Petitioner 
argued his conviction should be overturned because the 
United States District Court for the Southern District of 
California applied a test that was subsequently deemed 
improper by Miller.104  Further, the Petitioner argued that the 
District Court erred when it instructed the jury to apply a 
national obscenity standard, instead of applying a local 
community standard.105 
The Court held that “[t]he result of Miller cases . . . is to 
permit a juror sitting in obscenity cases to draw on knowledge 
of the community of vicinage from which he comes in deciding 
what conclusions ‘the average person, applying contemporary 
community standards’ would reach in a given case.”106  
 
 98. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 29.  The Court called their test “concrete 
guidelines to isolate ‘hard core’ pornography from expression protected by the 
First Amendment.”  Id. 
 99. Id. at 32–33. 
 100. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974). 
 101. Id. at 104. 
 102. Id. at 91. 
 103. Id. at 98. 
 104. Id. at 103. 
 105. Id.  The jury was instructed that “[c]ontemporary community standards 
means the standards generally held throughout this country concerning sex and 
matters pertaining to sex.”  Id. 
 106. Id. at 105. 
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Therefore, the jury is charged with interpreting what the 
standards are for the community in which the jury sits, and 
apply those standards to the material presented to them.107  
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, again affirmed that 
there “is no provable ‘national standard,’ and perhaps there 
should be none.”108  The Court also held, however, that the 
statewide standard approved of in Miller “did not mean that 
any such precise geographic area is required as a matter of 
constitutional law.”109  Thus, the Court held that even though 
a national standard is improper, no geographic area is 
necessary.110  This adds further confusion to what 
contemporary community standards actually are.  They are 
not to encompass the entire nation,111 but can be the size of 
California.112 
Again, Justice Brennan dissented.113  He was joined by 
Justice Stewart and Justice Marshall, and argued that “the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the State and 
Federal Governments from attempting wholly to suppress 
sexually oriented materials on the basis of their allegedly 
‘obscene’ contents.”114  Thus, they believed that it did not 
matter whether the material was judged by a local 
community standard or a national community standard; the 
result would always be an unconstitutional limit on speech.115 
2. The Application of the Miller Test to Modern 
Technology 
i. The Miller Test as Applied to Dial-a-Porn 
Sable Communications v. FCC, decided in 1989 is 
particularly demonstrative of the Court’s commitment to local 
community standards.116  At issue in Sable Communications 
 
 107. Id. at 106. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 105. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 31 (1973) (supporting the lower 
court’s jury instruction that they should “apply ‘contemporary community 
standards of the State of California’ ” ). 
 113. See Hamling, 418 U.S. at 103, 141 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 114. Id. at 141–42 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Paris Adult Theatre v. 
Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 113 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting)). 
 115. See id. 
 116. Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989). 
LAIRD FINAL 11/14/2012  12:54 AM 
1518 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52 
was the constitutionality of section 223(b) of the 
Communications Act of 1934, which prohibited “indecent as 
well as obscene interstate commercial telephone messages.”117  
The petitioners, who operated a “dial-a-porn” business 
“offer[ing] sexually oriented prerecorded telephone 
messages,”118 sought injunctive and declaratory relief against 
enforcement of the Act.119  The business was designed so that 
callers would call Sable Communications and pay for sexually 
explicit recordings.120  Sable did not play the recordings 
unless someone actively called its phone line,121 
distinguishing it from cases like Miller and its progeny, 
where the defendants were actively sending material to 
unsuspecting individuals.122 
The Court upheld the Act, reasoning that because the 
First Amendment does not extend to obscene speech, “there is 
no constitutional barrier to the ban on obscene dial-a-porn 
recordings.”123  Furthermore, the Court held that it does “not 
read § 223(b) as contravening the ‘contemporary community 
standards’ requirement of Miller.”124  The issue, however, was 
that Sable Communications, which was based in Los Angeles, 
was being judged by more restrictive communities than where 
the messages were being sent from.125  The Court stated that 
even though “Sable may be forced to incur some cost in 
developing and implementing a system of screening the locale 
of incoming calls,” Congress is still entitled to enact laws that 
prohibit the distribution of obscene materials.126  This holding 
indicates the strong support the Court has for the local 
community standard, even when companies are dealing with 
a national audience.127 
 
 
 117. Id. at 117. 
 118. Id. at 117–18. 
 119. Id. at 118. 
 120. Id. at 118–19. 
 121. Id. at 119. 
 122. See supra text accompanying notes 69–85. 
 123. Sable Commc’ns, 492 U.S. at 124. 
 124. Id. at 124. 
 125. See id. at 125. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
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ii. The Miller Test and the Internet 
The Sable Communications decision offered a preamble 
to how the Court applies local community standards to 
developing technologies that allow users to easily connect 
with everybody, but make it difficult to limit access to certain 
individuals.128  The Court’s first opportunity to consider 
governments’ ability to regulate obscenity on the Internet 
came in 1997 with Reno v. ACLU,129 where the Court heard a 
facial challenge to the Communications Decency Act of 1996 
(“CDA”).  In a 9-0 decision, the Court held that the CDA was 
unconstitutional because it was overbroad and, therefore, 
violated the First Amendment.130  Justice Stevens, writing for 
the Court, acknowledged that “[t]he Internet is ‘a unique and 
wholly new medium of worldwide human communication.’ ” 131  
The Court held that the Act amounted to government-
imposed content-based restriction on speech and that it was 
subject to and failed strict scrutiny.132  In finding the CDA 
overbroad, the Court was able to skirt the issue of whether or 
not the Miller obscenity standard applied to Internet 
content.133 
In 2002, however, the Court approached the issue 
squarely in Ashcroft v. ACLU.134  There, the Court heard 
another facial challenge to a federal statute regulating the 
Internet.  This time, the Court was asked to consider the 
constitutionality of the Child Online Protection Act of 1998 
(COPA).135  In a fractured 8-1 decision, with only Justice 
 
 128. In Sable Commc’ns, the Court noted that “[i]f Sable’s audience is 
comprised of different communities with different local standards, Sable 
ultimately bears the burden of complying with the prohibition on obscene 
messages.”  Id. at 126. 
 129. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).  In Reno, the Court was asked to 
consider the constitutionality of certain provisions of the Communications 
Decency Act of 1996, which attempted to “protect minors from ‘indecent’ and 
‘patently offensive’ communications on the Internet.”  Id. at 849. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 850. 
 132. Id. at 851, 878. 
 133. See id. 
 134. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564 (2002). 
 135. The Child Online Protection Act was passed in response to the Supreme 
Court finding the CDA unconstitutionally overbroad.  Children’s Online Privacy 
Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 231 (2006).  For an in-depth discussion of attempts 
by the federal government to regulate obscenity on the Internet, see generally 
Clay Calvert, The End of Forum Shopping in Internet Obscenity Cases?  The 
Ramifications of the Ninth Circuits Groundbreaking Understanding of 
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Stevens dissenting, the court rejected the challenge.136  The 
Court’s holding, however, was a narrow one: “COPA’s reliance 
on community standards to identify ‘material that is harmful 
to minors’ does not by itself render the statute substantially 
overbroad for purposes of the First Amendment.”137  Beyond 
that, little is clear. 
Despite upholding COPA’s use of community standards, 
the various opinions of the Justices demonstrated some 
support for reevaluating the application of such standards as 
applied to the Internet.  Justice Thomas, who was joined in 
his opinion by Justices Rehnquist and Scalia, were the only 
Justices who expressed support for applying contemporary 
community standards.138  His plurality opinion stated, “we do 
not believe that the [Internet’s] ‘unique characteristics’ justify 
adopting a different approach than that set forth in Hamling 
and Sable.”139 
No other Justices, however, accepted that the Hamling 
and Sable fit neatly into Internet obscenity cases.  Justice 
O’Connor wrote a concurrence to “express [her] views on the 
constitutionality and desirability of adopting a national 
standard for obscenity for regulation of the Internet.”140  
Although O’Connor agreed with the other Justices in the 
majority that the use of local community standard does not, 
by itself, deem COPA facially unconstitutional, she did 
predict that COPA may be found unconstitutional in an as-
applied challenge.141 
Justice Breyer agreed with O’Connor, and wrote: “[a] 
nationally uniform adult-based standard . . . significantly 
alleviates any special need for First Amendment 
protection.”142  Further, he believed applying a local 
community standard to the Internet was constitutionally 
unsound because it “provide[d] the most puritan communities 
with a heckler’s Internet veto affecting the rest of the 
Nation.”143  Justice Stevens, the sole dissenter, agreed with 
 
Community Standards in Cyberspace, 89 NEB. L. REV. 47 (2010). 
 136. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 566. 
 137. Id. at 585. 
 138. Id. at 583. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at 586 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 141. Id. at 587. 
 142. Id. at 591 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 143. Id. at 590. 
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Breyer on this issue.144  Thus, three Justices expressed direct 
support of the application of a national community 
standard.145 
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices Souter and Ginsburg, 
wrote that there was a real concern that “COPA in effect 
subjects every Internet speaker to the standards of the most 
puritanical community in the United States.”146  Therefore, 
although COPA was upheld, six Justices recognized that 
there is a problem with applying local community standards 
to the Internet.147  Beyond this, however, there is no clear 
holding from Ashcroft, leaving the question of what standard 
should apply to the Internet to be answered at a later date. 
iii. Lower Courts Attempt to Apply Ashcroft v. ACLU 
The Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Kilbride,148 
attempted to form a single holding from the Ashcroft decision 
to determine whether it is appropriate to apply a local 
community standard or a national community standard to 
obscene material available on the Internet.149  In Kilbride, the 
defendants were convicted for interstate transportation of 
obscene material in violation of federal obscenity statutes.150  
Their convictions “arose from conduct relating to their 
business of sending unsolicited bulk email . . . advertising 
adult websites.”151  The defendants challenged the application 
of the Hamling definition of contemporary community 
standards “[b]ecause persons utilizing email to distribute 
possibly obscene works cannot control which geographic 
community their works will enter . . . .”152  The Ninth Circuit 
 
 144. Id. at 612 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[I]n the context of the Internet [the] 
shield also becomes a sword, because the community that wishes to live without 
certain material not only rids itself, but the entire Internet of the offending 
speech.”). 
 145. Id. at 586 (O’Connor, J., concurring); id. at 591 (Breyer, J., concurring); 
id. at 612 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 146. Id. at 593 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  Kennedy concedes that although 
this is a “real concern,” it is not enough to invalidate the act.  Id. 
 147. In 2008, the Third Circuit held that the Child Online Protection Act was 
unconstitutional.  ACLU v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2009).  The Supreme 
Court refused to review the decision, effectively killing the Act.  Mukasey v. 
ACLU, 129 S. Ct. 1032 (2009). 
 148. United States v. Kilbride, 584 F.3d 1240 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 149. See id. at 1250–55. 
 150. Id. at 1245. 
 151. Id. at 1244. 
 152. Id. at 1250. 
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agreed with the defendants and, in construing the Ashcroft 
decision, held that “the distinctions Justices O’Connor and 
Breyer made between the constitutional concerns generated 
by application of a national and local community standards” 
must control.153 
Conversely, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals 
expressly rejected the Kilbride decision,154 and instead held 
that “the Miller contemporary community standard remains 
the standard by which the Supreme Court has directed us to 
judge obscenity, on the Internet and elsewhere.”155  Despite 
this, the Eleventh Circuit did note the growing discord 
surrounding the application of the Miller test to Internet 
material.156 
II. IDENTIFICATION OF THE PROBLEM 
Since the Supreme Court included obscenity in the 
narrow and well-defined area of unprotected speech,157 it has 
had trouble distinguishing between what is obscene and what 
is not.158  Although the Court claimed to create “concrete” 
guidelines, by incorporating contemporary community 
standards in Miller,159 the test has become problematic in the 
Internet age.  Those who wish to exercise their First 
Amendment right to free speech and, subsequently, post 
sexually explicit material cannot be sure who will access the 
material.  Thus, those individuals cannot be sure to which 
community’s standards they should tailor the material. 
When the Miller test was created in 1974, the nation had 
not yet begun incorporating modern communications into 
everyday life.  People from Maine and Mississippi seemed 
much more distinct than people from New York City and Las 
Vegas.160  The Court wanted to ensure that obscene material 
was not thrust upon those in the less tolerant areas, nor allow 
 
 153. Id. at 1254. 
 154. See United States v. Little, No. 08-15964, 2010 WL 357933, at *164 
(11th Cir. Feb. 2, 2010) (“We decline to follow the reasoning of Kilbride in this 
Circuit.  The portions of the Ashcroft opinion and concurrences that advocated a 
national community standard were dicta, not the ruling of the court.”). 
 155. Id.  
 156. Id. at *163. 
 157. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572–73 (1942). 
 158. See supra Part I.A.2. 
 159. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 29 (1973). 
 160. Miller, 413 U.S. at 32. 
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the less tolerant areas to govern what material could be 
accessed in more tolerant areas.161  The problem with 
maintaining a variable definition of obscenity,162 where a 
single image can be held obscene in one area and not obscene 
in other areas, is that once the image is posted to the 
Internet, anyone can access it from any part of the country.163 
The current circuit split between the Ninth and Eleventh 
Circuits muddies the waters further.164  With different tests 
being applied, and the fact that the material can be brought 
in any jurisdiction in which the material is found, purveyors 
of obscene material are subject to any and all community 
standards in existence. 
Eliminating Internet obscenity laws may solve the 
problems that exist when applying the Miller standard to the 
Internet.165 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. The Ninth Circuit’s Application of a National Community 
Standard Is Improper 
There are three reasons why the Ninth Circuit’s 
application of a national community standard is improper.  
First, a majority of the Justices did not support the 
application of a national community standard.166  Only 
Justices O’Connor and Breyer expressly stated that a 
national community standard should be applied when judging 
Internet material.167  Second, a national community standard 
will force more tolerant communities to lower their standards, 
thereby reducing their access to currently available 
material.168  Finally, there will always be a problem with how 
a fact finder is to determine what a national community 
standard actually is.169 
 
 161. See Mark Cenite, Federalizing or Eliminating Online Obscenity Law as 
an Alternative to Contemporary Community Standards, 9 COMM. L. & POL’Y 25, 
60–61 (2004). 
 162. See supra Part I.B.1. 
 163. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 566 (2002). 
 164. See supra Part I.C.2.iii. 
 165. See infra Part IV. 
 166. See infra Part III.A.1. 
 167. See supra Part I.C.2.ii. 
 168. See infra Part III.A.2. 
 169. See infra Part III.A.3. 
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1. A Majority of Supreme Court Justices Do Not Support 
a National Community Standard 
The Ninth Circuit’s reasoning rests on a shaky 
foundation because a majority of Supreme Court Justices did 
not advocate for a national community standard in any of the 
previous obscenity cases.  The Ninth Circuit was able to come 
to its conclusion that a national community standard is 
appropriate because a majority of the Justices expressed 
some concern over applying a local community standard to 
online material.170  The Kilbride Court held that because the 
“five Justices concurring in the judgment, as well as the 
dissenting Justice, viewed the application of local community 
standards in defining obscenity on the Internet as generating 
serious constitutional concerns . . . ,”171 it is appropriate to 
apply national community standards.  The five Justices that 
the Ninth Circuit believed made up the majority were 
Justices Kennedy, Breyer, Ginsburg, O’Connor and 
Stevens.172 
Justice Kennedy, in his concurrence which was joined by 
Justices Souter and Ginsburg, argued that it is inappropriate 
to require a national standard because it would “impose the 
community standards of Maine or Mississippi on Las Vegas 
and New York City.”173  He recognized that “[p]eople in 
different States vary in their tastes and attitudes, and this 
diversity is not to be strangled by the absolutism of imposed 
uniformity.”174  Despite this glaring rejection of a national 
community standard, the Ninth Circuit included Justice 
Kennedy in the “five Justices concurring in the judgment, as 
well as the dissenting Justice, viewed the application of local 
community standards in defining obscenity on the Internet as 
generating serious constitutional concerns.”175 
Only Justices O’Connor and Breyer wrote positively of a 
national community standard for online material.176  Further, 
only Justice Breyer expressed his belief that a national 
 
 170. United States v. Kilbride, 584 F.3d 1240, 1254 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 171. Id. 
 172. See id. at 1254–55. 
 173. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 597 (2001). 
 174. Id. (citing Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 33 (1973)). 
 175. Kilbride, 584 F.3d at 1254. 
 176. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 586 (O’Connor, J., concurring); id. at 605 (Breyer, 
J., concurring). 
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community standard applied.177  Justice O’Connor simply 
expressed her opinion of the “desirability of adopting a 
national standard for obscenity for regulation of the 
Internet.”178  She did not elaborate as to how lower courts are 
to apply such a standard.179  Additionally, she did not find 
that applying a local community standard is enough to make 
the Child Online Protection Act facially overbroad.180  
Therefore, one can conclude that even though Justice 
O’Connor believes that a national community standard may 
be desirable, it is not necessary. 
2. A National Community Standard Will Force More 
Tolerant Communities to Raise Their Standards 
to Conform to a National Community Standard 
There is another constitutional concern beyond the fact 
that no Justices support a national community standard.  If a 
national community standard applies to the Internet, places 
like New York City and Las Vegas will necessarily have to 
raise their community standards to meet that of the national 
average.  The Miller Court expressed this concern when the 
test was first introduced.  It found that “[t]he use of ‘national’ 
standards . . . necessarily implies that materials found 
tolerable in some places, but not under the ‘national’ criteria, 
will nevertheless be unavailable where they are 
acceptable.”181  Therefore, the Court recognized that even 
though it is important to maintain states’ police power, 
obscenity statutes cannot be upheld when individual’s rights 
to access obscene material is limited.182  The Court further 
explained “in terms of danger to free expression, the potential 
for suppression seems at least as great in the applications of a 
single nation-wide standard as in allowing distribution in 
accordance with local tastes.” 183 
 
 177. Id. at 586 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 178. Id. at 586. 
 179. See id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 32 n.13 (1973). 
 182. See id. 
 183. Id. 
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3. Juries’ Application of a National Community 
Standard 
In Miller, the Court dismissed the application of a 
national community standard and stated that it was 
hypothetical and unascertainable.184  But, has a national 
community standard become real and ascertainable since 
Miller was decided over thirty-five years ago?  The Ninth 
Circuit offered help to answer this question. 
Professor Clay Calvert185 believes, “[e]stimating what this 
national standard is . . . seems like an incredibly daunting 
and difficult task”186 because juries will “clearly . . . need some 
assistance in determining what the national community 
standard is.”187  Calvert argues juries already have a hard 
time determining what the local community standards are 
and that asking them to expand that further intensifies the 
problem.188  He asks whether “a cadre of expert witnesses who 
are ready to testify about what community standards are in 
various communities throughout the United States will 
develop?”189  Thus, even if a national community standard is 
held constitutionally required for Internet obscenity, it seems 
unlikely that one can be developed.190 
B. The Eleventh Circuit’s Application of Supreme Court 
Precedent Is Correct but Ignores that Such a Test Limits More 
Speech than Is Constitutionally Permissible 
1. The Eleventh Circuit’s Approach Is Consistent with 
Supreme Court Precedent 
The Eleventh Circuit was correct when it concluded that 
the local community standard is still controlling law.191  As 
discussed above, the fractured Ashcroft decision leads to the 
conclusion that Justices support reevaluating the Miller test 
 
 184. Id. at 24. 
 185. Clay Calvert is a Brechner Eminent Scholar in Mass Communications 
and Founding Director of the Marion B. Brechner First Amendment Project at 
the University of Florida.  Calvert, supra note 135, at 47. 
 186. Id. at 80. 
 187. Id. at 77. 
 188. Id.  
 189. Id.  
 190. See id. 
 191. See United States v. Little, No. 08-15964, 2010 WL 357933, at *164 
(11th Cir. Feb. 2, 2010). 
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as applied to the Internet.192  But, the Court did not hold that 
the local community standard should be abandoned.  
Additionally, a majority of Justices maintained that it is a 
proper test regardless of the trouble it provides.193 
First, Justices Thomas, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist 
and Justice Scalia, determined that although the community 
“need not be defined by reference to a precise geographic area 
. . . .  [A] juror applying community standards will inevitably 
draw upon personal ‘knowledge of the community or vicinage 
from which he comes.’ ” 194  Thus, these three Justices believe 
that a local community standard is inevitable.  They do not, 
however, hold that a national community standard is 
permissible, as the Ninth Circuit interpreted in Kilbride.195 
Second, Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices Ginsburg 
and Souter, continued to support the geographic autonomy 
that the Miller standard created.196  He noted that just as the 
First Amendment does not require that the people of “Maine 
or Mississippi accept public depiction of conduct found 
tolerable in Las Vegas, or New York City,” it also does not 
“impose the community standards of Maine or Mississippi on 
Las Vegas and New York.”197  If a national community 
standard is implemented, both results will manifest.  To 
create a national community standard, New York City and 
Las Vegas will impose some of the standards of Maine and 
Mississippi, and vice versa.  The result will be the end of any 
geographic autonomy that Justice Kennedy seems to 
support.198 
Thus, although six Justices found the application of local 
community standards troublesome,199 six justices also 
believed that it would be improper to abandon the local 
community standard.200 
 
 192. See supra Part I.C.2.ii. 
 193. See supra Part I.C.2.ii. 
 194. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 576–77 (2002). 
 195. United States v. Kilbride, 584 F.3d 1240, 1256 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 196. See Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 595–97. 
 197. Id. at 597 (Kennedy, J. concurring). 
 198. See id. 
 199. See supra Part I.C.2.ii. 
 200. See supra Part I.C.2.ii. 
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2. Local Community Standards Are Improper Despite 
Being Consistent with Supreme Court Precedent 
Although the Supreme Court has not yet advocated for a 
national community standard, if a local community standard 
governs obscenity on the Internet, there will continue to be a 
constitutional issues.  Justice Breyer’s prediction that more 
conservative localities will be given a heckler’s veto201 has 
come true in the form of forum shopping.202  Calvert writes 
that the federal government has always used forum shopping 
as a way to ensure that they will be successful in their 
prosecutions.203  He noted, “the federal government did not 
deny its strategic use of forum shopping in Project 
PostPorn,”204 which was the government’s “first nationwide 
prosecution of mail-order pornography.”205 
Under Project PostPorn, “federal agents went ‘into Bible 
Belt regions’ and initiated obscenity cases against California 
X-rated filmmakers in the belief that it [would] be easier to 
obtain convictions in conservative, rural America than in 
anything-goes Los Angeles.”206  Thus, the Miller standard’s 
application to the Internet did provide “conservative, rural 
America” with a heckler’s veto, and federal prosecutors 
exploited it.207 
IV. PROPOSAL 
A. Kilbride and Little Demonstrate that Both Local and 
National Community Standards Are Problematic 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision to abandon local community 
standards and the Eleventh Circuit’s decision to maintain 
local community standards illuminates the fact that both 
methods are constitutionally unsound.208  These tests need to 
 
 201. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 590 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 202. See Calvert, supra note 135, at 56–57. 
 203. See id. 
 204. Id. at 58. 
 205. Id. at 57. 
 206. Id. (citing John Johnson, Into the Valley of Sleaze: Demand Is Strong, 
but Police Crackdowns and a Saturated Market Spell Trouble for One of L.A.’s 
Biggest Businesses, L.A. TIMES MAG., Feb. 17, 1991, at 10 (attributing this 
assertion to “John Weston, a Beverly Hills attorney who has represented 
members of the hard-core film industry”)). 
 207. Id. at 56–58. 
 208. See supra Part I.C.2.iii. 
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be abandoned.  The problem, however, is that there are no 
clear alternatives that will both allow governments to 
regulate obscenity on the Internet, and maintain individual 
First Amendment rights. 
B. Eliminating Internet Obscenity Laws Is the Only Solution 
Clarity is necessary when governments regulate obscene 
material, which has proven to be particularly difficult.209  If 
laws are vague, they will necessarily limit more speech than 
is constitutionally acceptable.  The only solution to this 
problem is to eliminate Internet obscenity laws and find such 
laws unconstitutional.  Thus, Justice Brennan was correct 
when he stated in his Paris Adult Theatre dissent that “none 
of the available formulas . . . can reduce the vagueness to a 
tolerable level.”210 
Elimination of Internet obscenity law is the only 
alternative to the local community standard, which will give 
such speech full protection under the First Amendment.  This 
way, those who choose to post sexually explicit material on 
the Internet will not have to worry how the most conservative 
communities will judge that material.  When such people 
worry about the consequences of what they post, and then do 
not post, their First Amendment rights are necessarily 
violated.211  Thus, the only alternative to ensure that 
constitutionally protected material is not limited is to 
eliminate Internet obscenity laws completely. 
This alternative will result in constitutionally 
unprotected speech, that which would be considered obscene 
in all communities, to be available on the Internet.  This 
consequence, however, is justified in the absence of an 
alternative that protects speech that is not obscene.  Until 
there is a way to ensure such speech is protected, this is the 
only alternative that ensures constitutionally protected 
speech is not chilled. 
CONCLUSION 
The history of obscenity jurisprudence in the United 
States is tarnished with inconsistencies and the Internet 
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exacerbates the problem.  The recent circuit split 
demonstrates a need to reevaluate what governments are 
permitted to sensor on the Internet. 
The Court first held in Chaplinsky that obscenity is 
outside of the protection of the First Amendment.212  It was 
not until 1957, however, that it directly addressed obscenity 
and held that sexually explicit material should be judged by 
“contemporary community standards.”213  This phrase proved 
troublesome for the court, and it was not until 1973, when the 
court decided Miller, that five Justices agreed to its 
meaning.214  There, the Court rejected the use of a national 
community standard and instead proclaimed that the 
relevant community is a local one.215 
Since that time, the Court has maintained, at least to 
some extent, that the applicable standard to apply is a local 
standard, including for material posted on the Internet.216  
However, the recent circuit split between the Ninth and 
Eleventh Circuits demonstrates that applying a local 
community standard is troublesome.217  In order to ensure 
that constitutional freedoms are not limited, it is necessary 
that federal and state governments stop regulating obscenity 
on the Internet. 
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